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_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge,
Sotero Sanes appeals from a final judgment and
commitment order of the district court.

On December 29, 1993, an

information was filed charging Sanes with burglary in the first
degree, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 442(1); rape in the first
degree, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 1701(3); robbery in the first
degree, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 1862(2); and possession of a
dangerous weapon during the commission of a violent crime, in
violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2251(a)(2)(B).
Sanes was accused of attacking Carmen Velez on January
13, 1993 and again on July 14, 1993.

Counts I, II, III and IV

stem from the first attack and Counts V, VI and VII from the
second.

Sanes was convicted on all counts.
Sanes argues that the district court erred by denying

his motion to suppress.

He contends that the voice

identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive.

Further,

he argues that the district court abused its discretion by
limiting his expert witness' testimony about the validity of the
voice identification procedures.

Finally, Sanes contends that

the district court erred by denying his pretrial motion to sever
Counts I, II, III and IV from Counts V, VI and VII, arguing that
the charges arose from separate incidents and their joinder was
highly prejudicial to him.

We will affirm.
I.

Sanes argues that the trial court violated his right to
due process by denying his motion to suppress the voice
identification.

He contends that his voice sample was tainted by

outside factors, technical and otherwise, which could have
influenced the listener, making it more likely that his voice
would be selected.

He cites background voices, longer delivery

time, different transition time between the statements made in
Spanish and those made in English, his monotone and a number of
interruptions, as examples of the factors which he believes, when
taken cumulatively, compromised the reliability of the
identification.
We find no evidence that the procedures used were
impermissibly suggestive or that there was a substantial
likelihood of misidentification.

Ms. Velez heard the voice of

her attacker on both January 13, 1993 and July 14, 1993.

On each

occasion, she conversed with the intruder for ten minutes.
listened to the voice array three times.

She

She was ready to

identify Sample No. 4 after the second time, but was encouraged
by the police to listen to the tape one more time.

Velez then

positively identified the fourth voice as that of her attacker.
Sample No. 4 was Sanes' voice.
The district court listened to the voice array and
found that all of the voices contained unique factors.

After

listening to Sanes' expert witness on voice identification
procedures, the district further found that, although Sample No.

4 was different from the other samples, the differences did not
present a sufficiently significant contrast as to cause
misidentification.

Before denying Sanes' motion to suppress, the

district court applied the eyewitness identification test,
enunciated in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375 (1972)
and Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243 (1977).
Sanes argues that this test is inapposite.

We disagree.

In Neil, the Supreme Court developed a five-part test
to test the reliability of an eyewitness identification.

The

Neil factors include the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; the witness' degree of
attention; the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the
criminal; the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the time of the confrontation; and the length of time between the
crime and the confrontation.

93 S.Ct. at 382.

Expanding on

Neil, Manson held that admitting testimony even following a
suggestive identification procedure does not violate due process
if the identification has sufficient indicia of reliability.
S.Ct. at 2252-53.
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Although voice identification obviously

differs from eyewitness identification (for example, what is at
issue in the first part of the Neil and Manson test is
opportunity to view rather than opportunity to hear), we conclude
that the Neil and Manson eyewitness identification test, adapted
to voice identification, provides a standardized source of

guidance to district courts for assessing the reliability of
voice identification as well.
Applying Neil, the district court found that Ms. Velez
was alert and had a sufficient opportunity to view or hear her
attacker on both occasions and that she presented an accurate
description of the defendant and his clothing (which she later
identified.)

Moreover, she identified the items taken from

appellant as looking like items the perpetrator had worn, and
there is no evidence indicating that these items, when presented
to Ms. Velez, were suggestively linked to either the appellant or
to Sample No. 4.

Further, Ms. Velez stated that she was certain

that Sample No. 4 was the voice of her attacker.

Finally,

although there was a six-month period between the incidents, only
fifteen days elapsed between the last attack and her positive
voice identification.

We also note that Ms. Velez not only

listened to her attacker for a considerable period of time during
the two incidents but testified that she engagaed him in
conversation in the hope that she could identify his voice, and
hence the opportunity and degree of attention criteria of
Neil/Manson are met.

We also listened to the tape during oral

argument, and conclude that the evidence supports the district
court's findings and conclusions.

We conclude that the district

court properly applied the Neil/Manson factors and properly
denied Sanes' motion to suppress the voice identification.
II.

Sanes next argues that the district court erred by
prohibiting expert testimony comparing voice identification and
eyewitness identification.

The district court permitted the

testimony of Sanes' expert witness, Dr. Harry Hollien, a
professor of linguistics, on the question whether the voice
exemplar containing the defendant's voice was suggestive.

Dr.

Hollien was also permitted to comment on the distinguishing
characteristics of Sanes' voice sample and their impact, if any,
on Ms. Velez's positive identification.

However, the district

court would not permit Dr. Hollien to explain to the jury why
voice identification was not as accurate as eyewitness
identification under ideal circumstances.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, "[i]f scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education, may testify thereto in the form of opinion
or otherwise."

Whether to allow scientific or technical expert

testimony, however, is within the discretion of the district
court and is reviewed only for abuse.

United States v. Downing,

753 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1985).
Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
U.S.

, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993), when faced with the proffer of

expert scientific testimony under Rule 702, the district court
must preliminarily assess whether the testimony underlying the

reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and can properly
be applied to the facts at issue.

The district court properly

held a Daubert hearing in which the nature of Dr. Hollien's
testimony was fully considered.

We conclude that the district

court appropriately limited Dr. Hollien's expert testimony to the
pertinent issue of whether the distinguishing factors on Sample
No. 4 unduly influenced Ms. Velez's selection.

We also conclude

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
from the jury's consideration the testimony that would have
compared eyewitness and voice identification; such testimony was
of limited probative value, and that value would have been
outweighed by waste of time and confusion.

See Downing, 753 F.2d

at 1232.
III.
Finally, Sanes argues that the district court abused
its discretion by denying his pretrial motion to sever Counts I
through IV from Counts V, VI and VII.

He contends that joinder

of the counts involving two separate incidents substantially
impaired his right to a fair trial.

We disagree.

Ms. Velez's

testimony and a common modus operandi provided sufficient reason
to deny Sanes' motion to sever the counts and to conduct a single
trial.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 provides:
[I]f it appears that a defendant or the
government is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or of defendants in an indictment or
information or by such joinder for trial
together, the court may order an election of

separate trials of counts, grant a severance
of defendants or provide whatever other
relief justice requires. In ruling on a
motion by a defendant for severance the court
may order the attorney for the government to
deliver to the court for inspection in camera
any statements or confessions made by the
defendant which the government intends to
introduce in evidence at the trial.
Sanes must demonstrate that joinder would result in a
"manifestly unfair trial," beyond a mere showing that he would
have had a better chance of acquittal with separate trials.
United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 568 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 925, 112 S.Ct. 340 (1991).

Here, Ms. Velez

identified Sanes as the person who attacked her both times.
Moreover, during the second attack Sanes inculpated himself in
the first offense by referring to Ms. Velez' failure to keep
quiet following the first attack.

The modus operandi of the

crimes is similar and it was evident that Ms. Velez would have to
testify about both incidents, which would have required the
government to offer essentially the same proof in both trials.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by denying Sanes' motion to sever the counts that stem from the
first incident from those of the second.
IV.
In sum, we have examined all contentions raised by the
appellant and conclude that the district court's decisions were
proper in all respects.

We will affirm.

